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THE SOCIAL COSTS OF CHOICE, FREE MARKET 
IDEOLOGY AND THE EMPIRICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE 






This article explores the recent “hidden-fee” litigation trend that has 
consumed the 401(k) world and how recent decisions by these courts will 
likely result in reduced wealth for workers.  The author challenges the 
“large menu defense” espoused by the Third, Seventh and Eight Circuit 
Courts of Appeals as not fitting within the intent of ERISA’s “safe harbor.”  
In addition, the author questions the logic of these decisions by suggesting 
that courts are evaluating the employers’ legal responsibilities using free-
market ideology rather than the fiduciary duties prescribed by ERISA and 





 In October 2008, just after the peak of the financial crisis, former 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, testified: “I do have an 
ideology.  My judgment is that free, competitive markets are by far the 
unrivaled way to organize economies.  We’ve tried regulation.  None 
meaningfully worked.”1 In fact, regulation has often worked and worked 
well, as illustrated by reforms in pension plan regulation.  Investors often 
do behave like the rational actors on which the efficacy of free, competitive 
markets is based, especially when they are deciding whether to participate 
in their employers’ 401(k) plans.  Many employees do not participate, even 
when their employers offer to match employees’ contributions.  In 2006, 
Congress amended the Employee Retirement Security Income Act of 1974 
(ERISA) to permit employers to automatically enroll their employees in the 
company’s 401(k) plan.  As a result, plan participation rates have risen 
                                                                                                                                
* Associate Professor of Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law 
and Mississippi Defense Lawyers Association Distinguished Lecturer. 
1 Financial Crisis and the Role of Government Regulators: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 46 (2008). As the financial 
crisis unfolded around him, however, Chairman Greenspan acknowledged that he 
had become aware of a “flaw” in this ideology. Id. 
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dramatically.  This regulatory “nudge” has increased the wealth of millions 
of Americans. 
 In a series of recent decisions, however, federal courts have taken 
positions that effectively reduce employee participation rates in 401(k) 
plans.  They have exalted free market ideology in derogation of express 
regulatory mandates on the assumption that substituting their economic 
assumptions for legal requirements will maximize the wealth of 401(k) 
participants.  Yet their faith in free markets is not grounded in any 
empirical foundation.  In fact, their economic theories are directly 
contradicted by the overwhelming weight of empirical research, which 
shows that the effect of their decisions will reduce workers’ wealth rather 
than increase it.  This collision of judicial free-market ideology and 
financial reality, the subject of this article, is costing American workers 
billions of dollars in lost pension benefits every year. 
 Over the last decade, a slew of lawsuits have consumed the 401(k) 
world, making a substantial amount of new case law and sending 
employers in search of experts to find ways to protect them from liability.  
This so-called “hidden-fee litigation” generally involves claims that 
employers and other pension benefit plan fiduciaries violated ERISA’s 
“prudent man” rule by selecting investment options that charge excessive 
fees and hide information about fees from participants.  Some courts have 
dismissed claims against employers that offer a large number of investment 
options in their plans on the ground that, regardless of whether the 
employer acted imprudently, the legal cause of any resulting loss was the 
participant’s choice of the option(s) in which to invest.  These courts 
consider large 401(k) menus to offer a kind of marketplace that trumps 
employers’ fiduciary obligations.  This “large menu defense” creates an 
incentive for employers to increase the number of options in their 401(k) 
plans in order to minimize their ERISA liability risk. 
 These courts have ignored ERISA’s express imposition of liability 
on plan fiduciaries for failing to exercise due care in choosing plan 
investment options.  Section 404(a) of the Act establishes a “prudent man” 
standard that requires, among other things, that plan sponsors choose 
investment options with due care.  Section 404(c) provides a safe harbor 
(“404(c)” or “control” safe harbor) from Section 404(a) liability to the 
extent that a self-directed plan permits a participant “to exercise control 
over the assets in his account.”  Under Section 404(c)’s authority, the 
Department of Labor (DOL) has adopted rules providing that a participant 
may be deemed to have exercised control if, among other things, the plan 
offers a “broad range of investment alternatives” that enables participants 
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to create portfolios with risk-return characteristics that are appropriate for 
the participant. 
 Some courts have deemed participants to have exercised control 
under the 404(c) safe harbor if a plan’s range of options is so broad that, in 
the court’s opinion, it approximates the range of options that would be 
available in a free market.2 The availability of a large range of options 
thereby abrogates employer responsibility for imprudently selecting 
investment options.  The large menu defense effectively substitutes judicial 
economic theories for statutory fiduciary duties, based primarily on the 
courts’ ideological view, like Chairman Greenspan’s, that participants’ 
choices should be regulated by free market principles rather than under 
ERISA’s fiduciary duties.  The courts’ view, consistent with widely 
accepted rational choice theory, is that offering the largest range of choices 
will maximize workers’ wealth.  Indeed, they view increasing choice, in 
and of itself, as a central purpose of ERISA. 
 This de facto judicial nullification of ERISA’s prudent man rule 
would not be of such concern if the courts were correct that larger menus 
create wealth for workers.  In that case, employers that increased the 
number of options in their plans in order to reduce their ERISA liability 
risk would also maximize the social benefits of 401(k) plans.  However, 
empirical research shows that larger menus are inversely correlated with 
workers’ wealth.  Large 401(k) menus result in lower participation rates, 
overly conservative allocations, inferior investment options and other 
adverse effects that, collectively, cost workers billions of dollars every 
year.  Notwithstanding the courts’ views on rational choice theory, “a fully 
informed and fully rational investor would prefer a smaller menu.”3 
 Section I of this article describes the legal framework for employers’ 
liability under ERISA in connection with the selection of plan investment 
options.  Section II discusses the large menu defense adopted by courts that 
have dismissed fiduciary claims against employers that were alleged to 
have selected options impudently.  The courts’ free-market rationale for the 
large menu defense is described in Section III, and Section IV sets forth the 
empirical research on the wealth-reducing effects of large menus in 401(k) 
plans.  Section V concludes. 
                                                                                                                                
2 See infra Section II. 
3  David Goldreich & Hanna Hałaburda, When Smaller Menus Are Better: 
Variability in Menu-Setting Ability 4 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 11-
086, 2011), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/11-086. 
pdf. 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
 ERISA generally applies to “employee benefit plans,” which are 
defined to include employee welfare benefit plans and employee pension 
benefit plans.4 This article is concerned with pension benefit plans, such as 
401(k) plans, which are defined as funds or programs maintained by an 
employer that “(i) provide retirement income to employees, or (ii) result in 
a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination 
of covered employment or beyond.” 5  If an employer offers a pension 
benefit plan, ERISA requires that it identify at least one “named” fiduciary 
who is responsible for the administration of the plan.  For example, the plan 
trustee is a named plan fiduciary.  A person can also become a fiduciary by 
exercising discretion over plan assets or providing advice for a fee to the 
plan.  A plan fiduciary can designate another person as a fiduciary and 
thereby shift their fiduciary responsibilities to that person. 
 A plan fiduciary is subject to two primary sets of duties under 
ERISA.  First, Section 404(a) of ERISA subjects fiduciaries to a prudent 
man standard of care.  They must act with the “care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence” that a “prudent man acting in a like capacity” would use in 
selecting investment options and diversifying the plan’s investments “so as 
to minimize the risk of large losses.”  Section 404(a) also imposes a duty of 
loyalty.  Fiduciaries must discharge their duties “solely in the interests of 
the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of: (i) 
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying 
reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”  
 Second, ERISA prohibits plan fiduciaries from engaging in a broad 
range of transactions with the plan.  Specifically, Section 406(b) of ERISA 
prohibits fiduciaries from dealing with plan assets in the fiduciary’s “own 
interest,” acting on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction, or receiving 
any consideration from any party dealing with the plan in connection with a 
transaction involving the assets of the plan.  Plan participants have a private 
right of action against fiduciaries to recover losses resulting from a breach 
of their obligations under ERISA.6 The breadth of Sections 404(a) and 
406(b), coupled with a private right of action for damages, presents 
employers with significant liability risk.  
                                                                                                                                
4 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2006). 
5 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2006). 
6 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006). 
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 To mitigate this risk, ERISA provides a number of statutory safe 
harbors for fiduciaries, which are supplemented by prohibited transaction 
exemptions and interpretive safe harbors promulgated by the DOL.7 Plan 
fiduciaries generally attempt to limit their liability by conforming their 
conduct to these safe harbors and exemptions.  One of the most commonly 
relied-upon safe harbors is provided by Section 404(c)(1)(A)(ii) (“404(c)” 
or “control” safe harbor), which insulates fiduciaries from liability for 
losses resulting “from the participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control” 
over the assets in his account.  
 The DOL has set forth a number of conditions on the availability of 
the 404(c) safe harbor.  These conditions include offering a diversified set 
of investment options and providing participants with sufficient 
information to evaluate them.  A participant has “exercised control” if, 
among other things, he “has an opportunity to choose, from a broad range 
of investment alternatives, the manner in which some or all of the assets in 
his account are invested.”8 A “broad range of investment alternatives” has 
been provided if the participant has an opportunity to: (1) materially affect 
the potential return and degree of risk of the account; (2) diversify so as to 
minimize the risk of large losses; and (3) choose from at least three 
diversified investment options. 9  These investment options must have 
materially different risk and return characteristics such that they can be 
combined in a portfolio with aggregate risk-return characteristics that are 
                                                                                                                                
7 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1108(b)(19) (2006) (exemption from Section 406(b)(2) 
for certain cross transactions); Class Exemption To Permit Certain Loans of 
Securities by Employee Benefit Plans, 71 Fed. Reg. 63,786 (Feb. 2, 2006) 
(exemption from Section 406(b)(1) with respect to securities lending activities); 
Class Exemption for Cross-Trades of Securities by Index and Model-Driven 
Funds, 67 Fed. Reg. 6614 (Feb. 12, 2002) (exemption from 406(b)(2) with respect 
to certain cross transactions involving passively managed funds); Class Exemption 
for Securities Transactions Involving Employee Benefit Plans and Broker-Dealers, 
51 Fed. Reg. 41,686 (Nov. 18, 1986) (exemption from Section 406(b) to 
fiduciaries that execute transactions on behalf of a plan); Class Exemption for 
Certain Transactions Between Investment Companies and Employee Benefit Plans, 
42 Fed. Reg. 18,732 (Apr. 8, 1977) (exemption for fiduciary when acting in 
capacity of investment adviser to mutual fund in which plan assets are invested); 
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e) (2012) (no breach of fiduciary duty solely by reason 
of receiving soft dollar benefits limited to brokerage and research services). 
8 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c–1(b)(1)(ii) (2013). 
9 29 C.F.R. §2550.404c-1(b)(iii) (2013). 
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within the range that is appropriate for the participant and that tend to 
minimize the risk of the overall portfolio. 
 Over the last decade, a series of lawsuits against plan fiduciaries has 
challenged the edifice of safe harbors and exemptions on which they have 
come to depend.  The plaintiffs in these lawsuits – lawsuits which are often 
referred to as “hidden fee litigation” – have generally claimed that plan 
fiduciaries violated their duties by offering investment options that charge 
excessive and/or hidden fees.  Plaintiffs allege that fees were hidden 
because they were not disclosed to participants and excessive because the 
plans invested in retail classes of fund shares that made side payments to 
plan services providers (known as “revenue sharing” payments) rather than 
in less expensive institutional classes of shares.  The hidden fee litigation 
has generated dozens of judicial decisions addressing a broad array of 
issues under ERISA. 
 This article focuses on the role that the size of a plan’s menu of 
investment options has played in the application of the 404(c) safe harbor 
and the disposition of these cases.  As discussed immediately below, a 
number of courts have found that offering a large menu of investment 
options supports a finding that participants exercised control for purposes 
of the safe harbor.  These courts have expressly rejected the DOL’s 
“paternalistic” view that plan fiduciaries are responsible for any options 
that have been imprudently included in the mix even when participants 
have been able to choose from a large number of alternatives.  
 
II.  THE LARGE MENU DEFENSE 
 
 In one set of hidden fee cases, courts have held that offering a large 
number of investment options can protect an ERISA fiduciary from 
liability, while offering a small number may increase a fiduciary’s legal 
exposure.  The leading case for the “large menu defense” is Hecker v. 
Deere & Co., in which the Seventh Circuit found that Deere’s offering of 
thousands of investment options in its 401(k) helped establish that, even if 
some options had been imprudently selected, Deere’s imprudence could not 
have been a legal cause of the plaintiffs’ losses.10 The court found that the 
large menu of investment options effectively placed the participant in 
control of his investment decisions, thereby relieving Deere of potential 
liability.  
                                                                                                                                
10 Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 584–87 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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 In Hecker, a class of participants in Deere’s 401(k) plan sued Deere 
for breaching its fiduciary duty to the plan by, among other things, 
selecting investment options that charged excessive, hidden fees.  The 
plaintiffs generally alleged that the fees were excessive because: (1) the 
administrator of the plan was compensated indirectly through revenue 
sharing payments by the investment options in which the plans invested 
rather than directly from the plans themselves; and (2) those fees were not 
reasonable in view of the services provided.  They argued that Deere 
violated its fiduciary duty by failing to exercise proper care in evaluating 
and selecting the investment options.  
 The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the 
ground that Deere was protected by ERISA’s 404(c) safe harbor.  As noted 
above, the 404(c) safe harbor insulates fiduciaries from liability for any 
loss that “results from the participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control” 
over the assets in his account.  The court found that Deere had satisfied the 
404(c) safe harbor by offering a large number of investment options.11 The 
plan offered twenty-three Fidelity mutual funds, two funds managed by 
Fidelity Trust, an employer stock fund, and an investment window that 
provided access to more than 2,500 funds managed by different 
companies.12 The district court found that, in light of the large number of 
investment options and the impossibility of every one of them having an 
excessive expense ratio, “[t]he only possible conclusion is that to the extent 
participants incurred excessive expenses, those losses were the result of 
participants exercising control over their investments within the meaning of 
the safe harbor provision.”13 Whether Deere exercised due care in selecting 
the investment options did not matter to the court: “[a]ssuming . . . that 
defendants failed to satisfy their fiduciary obligation to consider expenses 
when selecting mutual fund investment options, they are nevertheless 
insulated from liability by the safe harbor provision because of the nature 
and breadth of funds made available to participants under the plans.”14 
 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed that Deere had “include[d] a 
sufficient range of options so that the participants have control over the risk 
                                                                                                                                
11 Although the 404(c) safe harbor is an affirmative defense that normally 
would not be available at the pleading stage, the court found that the plaintiffs had 
opened the door to defense by anticipating the safe harbor in their complaint. 
12 556 F.3d at 578. 
13 Hecker v. Deere & Co., 496 F. Supp. 2d 967, 976 (W.D. Wis. 2007). 
14 Id. at 976. 
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of loss.”15 Assuming that Deere had a duty to “furnish an acceptable array 
of investment vehicles,” the court found that the “wide range of expense 
ratios among the 20 Fidelity mutual funds and the 2,500 other funds 
available through [the plan]” satisfied this duty.16 Any losses experienced 
by participants were “attributable to their individual choices.  Given the 
numerous investment options, varied in type and fee, neither Deere nor 
Fidelity . . .  can be held responsible for those choices.”17 
 The Third Circuit adopted Hecker’s large menu defense in Renfro v. 
Unisys Corp.18 In Renfro, a class of participants in Unisys Corporation’s 
401(k) plan sued Unisys for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA.  As in 
Hecker, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants’ selection of investment 
options was imprudent because the options charged revenue sharing 
payments that were hidden and excessive.  The plan, one of the largest one 
percent of 401(k) plans in the U.S., held approximately $2 billion in more 
than seventy different investment options.  Nearly $1.9 billion of that 
amount was held in “Fidelity-branded” retail mutual funds that plaintiffs 
alleged had charged excessive fees. 
 The district court granted Unisys’s motion to dismiss on the ground 
that “no rational trier of fact could find, on the basis of the facts alleged in 
the operative complaint, that the Unisys Defendants breached an ERISA 
fiduciary duty by offering this particular array of investment vehicles.”19 
The court, citing Hecker in support, found that Unisys could not be held 
liable for the selection of investments because it had offered a broad range 
of investment alternatives, regardless of whether it had placed any 
inappropriate investment options in the plan. 20  The participants “could 
choose from among the investment options to create a portfolio tailored to 
meet their investment objectives,”21 which insulated Unisys from liability.  
The court considered Unisys’s large menu to support both a Rule 12(b)(6) 
                                                                                                                                
15 556 F.3d at 589. 
16 Id. at 586. 
17 Id. at 590. 
18 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 2011). 
19 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., No. 07-2098, 2010 WL 1688540, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 
Apr. 26, 2010). 
20 Id. at *9. 
21 Id. at *5. 
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motion to dismiss and a summary judgment motion based on the 404(c) 
safe harbor.22 
 The Third Circuit declined to rule on the safe harbor issue, but 
affirmed the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the complaint on the basis of the 
large menu defense.  The court observed that the plan included “seventy-
three distinct investment options . . . company stock, commingled funds, 
and mutual funds . . . [representing] a variety of risk and fee profiles,”23 
thereby accomplishing ERISA’s purpose of “offer[ing] participants 
meaningful choices about how to invest their retirement savings.” 24 
Following Hecker’s lead, the court found that offering a large number of 
investment options insulated Unisys from liability as to the particular 
options it had selected for the plan. 
 The district court in Renfro took Hecker one step further by raising 
the possibility that, if the number of funds were a factor supporting 
liability, liability might arise from the offering of too few investment 
options in a plan, not too many.  The court observed that, while the plan in 
Hecker included more than 2,500 options, “the Hecker court in no way 
indicated that fiduciaries to an ERISA plan breach their duty when they 
offer less than a few thousand investment options to plan participants.”25 In 
fact, a court had already found that offering too few options might increase 
a plan sponsor’s liability risk.   
 In Braden v. Wal-Mart, the Eighth Circuit found that the relatively 
small number of investment options in Wal-Mart’s 401(k) provided support 
for plaintiffs’ claim that Wal-Mart had managed the plan imprudently.26 As 
in Hecker and Renfro, a class of 401(k) participants alleged that the plan’s 
fees were excessive and hidden, and that Wal-Mart had failed adequately to 
investigate lower-cost alternatives.  The Wal-Mart plan offered only “ten 
mutual funds, a common/collective trust, Wal-Mart common stock, and a 
stable value fund.”  The court characterized the plaintiffs as alleging that 
the “[p]lan include[d] a relatively limited menu of funds which were 
selected by Wal-Mart executives despite the ready availability of better 
                                                                                                                                
22 Although the court did not rely on the control safe harbor per se in granting 
the motion to dismiss, it effectively adopted the safe harbor’s reasoning. The 
following discussion treats this court as having applied the control safe harbor. 
23 671 F.3d at 327. 
24 Id.  
25 Renfro, 2010 WL 1688540, at n.6. 
26 Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009). 
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options.”27 It specifically compared Wal-Mart’s small menu of options with 
the 2,500 mutual funds offered by the plan in Hecker, and quoted the 
Hecker court’s finding that it was “untenable to suggest that all of the more 
than 2,500 publicly available investment options had excessive expense 
ratios.”28 In contrasting the present facts with Hecker, the court concluded 
that “[t]he far narrower range of investment options available in this case 
makes more plausible the claim that this Plan was imprudently 
managed.”29 
 The Renfro court made the inverse relationship between Hecker’s 
large menu defense and Braden’s small menu stigma explicit in describing 
the cases as sharing a “similar analytical framework”: “Both courts looked 
first to the characteristics of the mix and range of options and then 
evaluated the plausibility of claims challenging fund selection against the 
backdrop of the reasonableness of the mix and range of investment 
options.”30 The court in Renfro viewed small-menu Braden as taking the 
same approach as large-menu Hecker in declining to dismiss “in light of a 
plan that had far fewer available investment options than the plan in 
Hecker.”31 
 The large menu defense caught the attention of the DOL, which 
objected to the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Hecker.  In an amicus brief, 
the DOL complained that the court’s decision would provide a defense for 
a fiduciary’s imprudent selection of investment options if the fiduciary 
                                                                                                                                
27 Id. at 596. 
28 Id. at n.6 (quoting Hecker, 556 F.3d at 581).  
29 Id. (emphasis added); see Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d 
959, 963 (S.D. Iowa 2010) (citing argument that limited menu in Braden, 
compared with large menu in Hecker, made imprudent management claim more 
plausible); Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (reiterating 
the argument in Ruppert). 
30 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 326 (3d Cir. 2011). 
31 Id. at 327. (“We agree with our sister circuits' approach to evaluating these 
claims. An ERISA defined contribution plan is designed to offer participants 
meaningful choices about how to invest their retirement savings. Accordingly, we 
hold the range of investment options and the characteristics of those included 
options – including the risk profiles, investment strategies, and associated fees – 
are highly relevant and readily ascertainable facts against which the plausibility of 
claims challenging the overall composition of a plan's mix and range of investment 
options should be measured.”). 
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simply selected a large number of options. 32  In response, the Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged that such a strategy would “result in the inclusion of 
many investment alternatives that a responsible fiduciary should exclude 
[and] . . . place an unreasonable burden on unsophisticated plan participants 
who do not have the resources to pre-screen investment alternatives.”33 
This concession seemed to reflect the court’s reconsideration of the large 
menu defense, but the court said nothing about this “burden on 
unsophisticated plan participants” lessening their ultimate responsibility for 
losses under the safe harbor.  Nor did the court disavow the dispositive 
weight afforded to the offering of a large number of investment options in 
determining whether the participant had exercised control over his account.  
 The Seventh Circuit soon removed any doubt about its commitment to 
the large menu defense.  In Loomis v. Exelon Corp.,34 the court relied on 
Hecker’s large menu defense to dismiss hidden-excessive fee claims 
against Exelon Corp.35  Its understanding of Hecker and Hecker II was 
unambiguous: “By offering a wide range of options, Hecker held, Deere's 
plan complied with ERISA's fiduciary duties.  Plaintiffs contend that the 
                                                                                                                                
32 Amended Brief of the Sec’y of Labor, Elaine Chao, as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Hecker v. Deere & Co., 2008 WL 5731147 (7th 
Cir. April 4, 2008) (No. 08-1224).  
33 Hecker v. Deere & Co., 569 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2009) [hereinafter 
Hecker II]. Phyllis Borzi, the Assistant Secretary for the Employee Benefits 
Administration, has cited finding “‘a disturbing trend’ among plan sponsors 
seeking to avoid ERISA responsibility by ‘just giving choices’” in reference to 
401(k) brokerage account windows. Hazel Bradford, Borzi: Sponsors Have Always 
Been Responsible for Monitoring Brokerage Windows, PENSION & INVESTMENTS 
(June 18, 2012), http://www.pionline.com/article/20120618/DAILYREG/ 
120619900/borzi-sponsors-have-always-been-responsible-for-monitoring-
brokerage-windows. This statement was made in the context of guidance issued by 
the Department of Labor (“DOL”) in May 2012 that took the position that 
employers may be responsible for decisions made within a 401(k) brokerage 
account window.  See Robert Steyer, Labor Department Stands Firm on Self-
Directed Brokerage Account Guidance, PENSION & INVESTMENTS (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://www.pionline.com/article/20120601/DAILYREG/120609983/labor- 
department-stands-firm-on-self-directed-brokerage-account-guidance. The DOL 
later withdrew that position under industry pressure.  See Robert Steyer, ‘Intensive’ 
Lobbying Behind DOL Turnabout on DC Plan Brokerage Window, PENSION & 
INVESTMENTS (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.pionline.com/article/20120806/ 
PRINTSUB/308069984. 
34 Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 658 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2011).  
35 Id. 
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panel in Hecker retreated from this holding when denying a petition for 
rehearing [in Hecker II].  It did not.”36 
 The court characterized Hecker as having “held that as a matter of 
law that [Deere offered] an acceptable array of investment options, 
observing that ‘all of these funds were also offered to investors in the 
general public, and so the expense ratios necessarily were set against the 
backdrop of market competition.’”37 
 The Loomis court applied the Hecker large menu defense in finding 
that Exelon could not be faulted if it selected hidden excessive fee options 
for the plan because, with thirty-two investment options to choose from, 
                                                                                                                                
 36 Id. at 670.  Notwithstanding the court’s definitive statement that Hecker II 
did not represent a change in the court’s position, the DOL has argued that Hecker 
II “backed away” from the “breadth of its earlier ruling,” citing the Seventh 
Circuit’s subsequent decision in Howell. Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633 F.3d 552 
(7th Cir. 2011). See Brief for the Sec’y of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 2011 WL 2178417 at *24 (9th Cir. 
May 25, 2011) (No. 10-56415) (quoting Howell, 633 F.3d at 567 (citing Hecker, 
569 F.3d at 708)).  However, Howell involved the prudence of offering an 
employer stock option in the plan, and courts have applied a different, arguably 
inconsistent standard in cases involving employer stock.  Howell, 633 F.3d. at 567. 
Howell’s position on the responsibility of employers for imprudently selecting 
employer stock as an option directly contradicts the same court’s position on the 
selection of other types of options: “The choice of which investments will be 
presented in the menu that the plan sponsor adopts is not within the participant's 
power. It is instead a core decision relating to the administration of the plan and the 
benefits that will be offered to participants. . . . It is . . . the fiduciary's 
responsibility . . . to screen investment alternatives and to ensure that imprudent 
options are not offered to plan participants. Id. Although beyond the scope of this 
article, it is worth noting that courts such as Howell have been more willing to 
second-guess employers’ choice of employer stock as an option than diversified 
mutual funds notwithstanding that ERISA provides a specific statutory safe harbor 
for employer stock.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (2011); see, e.g., Pfeil v. State 
Street Bank & Trust Co., 671 F.3d 585 (6th Cir. 2012); Peabody v. Davis, 636 F.3d 
368 (7th Cir. 2011); DiFelice v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 410 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Langbecker v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 476 F.3d 299 (5th Cir. 2007); Dann v. 
Lincoln Nat’l Corp., 274 F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
37 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 670 (quoting Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586). See Spano v. 
Boeing, 633 F.3d 574, 586 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Cf. Hecker, 556 F.3d 575, 584–87 
(7th Cir. 2009) (noting that the record showed sufficient variety in investments and 
fee levels to satisfy ERISA requirements)”); Loomis v. Exelon Corp., No. 06 CV 
4900, 2009 WL 4667092 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2009) (endorsing Hecker’s 
“sufficient mix of investments defense”). 
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“[a]ny participant who want[ed] a fund with expenses under 0.1% can get it 
through Exelon's Plan.”38 The court appeared to believe that the employer 
did not have a fiduciary duty to abjure excessive or hidden fee investment 
options for its plan because the large number of options offered ensured 
that at least one low-cost option was available. 
 Thus, the Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuits have taken the position 
that a large 401(k) menu can protect a plan fiduciary from liability for 
imprudently selecting investment options for the plan.  Even assuming that 
the plan fiduciary violated Section 404(c)’s prudent man standard in the 
selection of investment options, the availability of a large number of 
options abrogated the fiduciary’s legal responsibility under ERISA.  
Conversely, offering a small menu of investment options, as in Wal-Mart, 
made it “more plausible” that the plan was imprudently managed.  The 
large menu defense courts view participants as having exercised safe 
harbor control when the number of investment options is large enough that 
the participants’ choices become the effective, proximate cause of any 
losses resulting from, for example, excessive fees.  
 Although no other court has directly addressed the large menu 
defense, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the mainstay of the large menu 
defense theory that employers’ responsibility for imprudently selecting 
investment options can be abrogated in the context of a menu of diversified 
investment options.  In Tibble v. Edison Int’l, the court explained that 
treating a participant’s act of choosing an investment option as abrogating 
the employer’s responsibility for selecting options could not be reconciled 
with the plain meaning of the statute.39 The court found that considering the 
participant’s investment decision as an intervening cause of the 
participant’s loss, i.e., a safe-harbor exercise of control, “would render 
parts of the ERISA statute a nullity by making it nearly impossible for 
defined-contribution-plan beneficiaries to vindicate fiduciary 
imprudence.”40 Defendants in ERISA cases would always be able to pass 
                                                                                                                                
38 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671. 
39 Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). In Tibble, the 
court affirmed the district court’s finding that the employer had imprudently failed 
to consider the potential cost savings of selecting institutional rather than retail 
classes of mutual fund shares. During the relevant period, the plan at issue offered 
from six to fifty investment options. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 639 F. Supp. 2d 
1074, 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit 
addressed the issue of the size of the menu. 
40 Tibble, 711 F.3d at 1074 (citing LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 
552 U.S. 248, 256 (2008) (citing the DOL's regulations implementing section 
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responsibility for losses to participants because “there can be no loss 
without the participant selecting an investment.”41 The Tibble court agreed 
with the DOL’s view that the employer’s selection of investment options 
necessarily precedes the participant’s investment decision and therefore 
should reasonably be viewed as the most salient cause of losses arising 
from the inclusion of a particular option in the 401(k) menu.42 As explained 
in Tibble, the large menu defense contradicts the plain meaning of the 
control safe harbor. 
 The large menu defense interpretation of the control safe harbor also 
fails because it misreads the purpose of the safe harbor’s “broad range of 
investment alternatives” requirement.  The courts view the broad-range 
requirement as reflecting a policy favoring large menus, as if its purpose 
were to maximize participant choice.  The Renfro court stated that “[a]n 
ERISA defined contribution plan is designed to offer participants 
meaningful choices,”43 which Loomis echoed in characterizing the 404(c) 
safe harbor as “encourag[ing] sponsors to allow more choice to participants 
in defined-contribution plans.” 44  The courts interpret the safe harbor’s 
diversification requirement as reflecting Congress’s wish that employers 
offer as many options as feasible to provide participants with the greatest 
possible control over their investments.  
 This choice-for-choice’s sake view misunderstands that the broad-
range requirement is designed to promote diversification, not large menus.  
It is intended to incentivize employers to offer menus that enable 
participants to construct an efficient portfolio with appropriate risk-return 
characteristics. 45  The diversification purpose of the broad-range 
                                                                                                                                
404(c) in rejecting the converse interpretation) and Langbecker, 476 F.3d at 321 
(Reavley, J., dissenting) (“All commentators recognize that § 404(c) does not shift 
liability for a plan fiduciary's duty to ensure that each investment option is and 
continues to be a prudent one.”)). 
41 Tibble, 711 F.3d at 1073 (“For a 401(k) (or for any defined-contribution 
plan for that matter), it is admittedly the case that monetary damage flowing from a 
fiduciary's imprudent design of the investment menu passes through the 
participant, as intermediary. But is it proper to conclude that those losses, in the 
language of section 404(c), ‘result from’ the participant's choice? This might seem 
an odd question given that, literally speaking, there can be no loss without the 
participant selecting an investment.”). 
42 Id. 
43 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. (2011). 
44 Loomis v. Exelon Corp., 658 F.3d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 2011). 
45  A “broad range of investment alternatives” has been provided if the 
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requirement is illustrated by the following example.  If a participant who 
planned to retire in 2008 had invested 100% of her assets in stock funds 
(which would have declined precipitously that year), that unfortunate 
allocation decision would have reflected her exercise of control if the 
employer had provided a diversified menu of options, including fixed 
income options in which she could have invested to create a more 
appropriate portfolio.46 The allocation would have been entirely outside the 
employer’s control.47 In contrast, if the stock funds that she chose were 
                                                                                                                                
participant has an opportunity to: (1) materially affect the potential return and 
degree of risk of the account;, (2) diversify to as to minimize the risk of large 
losses; and (3) choose from at least three diversified investment options. These 
investment options must have materially different risk and return characteristics 
such that they can be combined in a portfolio: (1) with aggregate risk-return 
characteristics that are within the range that is appropriate for the participant and 
(2) that tends to minimize the risk of the overall portfolio. See 29 C.F.R. § 
2550.404c–1. 
 46 As stated by the Seventh Circuit in an employer-stock option case, “it would 
make no sense [under the 404(c) safe harbor] to blame the fiduciary for the 
participant's decision to invest 40% of her assets in Fund A and 60% in Fund B, 
rather than splitting assets somehow among four different funds, emphasizing A 
rather than B, or taking any other decision.” Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 633 F.3d 
552, 567 (7th Cir. 2011). (As noted earlier, the Seventh Circuit has not applied its 
analysis in employer-stock cases to cases involving the selection of other types of 
investment options.) The Hecker and Loomis courts effectively held that choosing 
an excessive fee option over a non-excessive fee option from a large menu is the 
equivalent of choosing Fund A over Fund B, in that the participant’s decision is the 
proximate cause of both decisions. But the Hecker and Loomis analysis does not 
make sense as an interpretation of the DOL’s “broad range” requirement. That 
requirement is designed to produce a menu with diversified risk/return 
characteristics; it is not designed to produce a menu that is diversified in the sense 
of offering a mix of excessive and non-excessive fee options. 
 47 Although the participant’s allocation may have been the legal cause of the 
losses, research shows that the selection of the menu, even if it is adequately 
diversified, also bears a causal relationship to the participant’s allocation. For 
example, participants will invest a much higher percentage of plan assets in stock 
funds when a plan offers a mix of four stock funds and one bond fund than when 
the plan offers a mix of one stock fund and four bond funds. See Shlomo Benartzi 
& Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution 
Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79, 87 (2001) (finding that when equity options 
comprised a larger percentage of hypothetical options, study subjects invested a 
larger percentage of accounts in equities than when equity options comprised a 
smaller percentage of options), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/ 
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imprudently selected because they charged excessive fees, then the 
employer would be responsible for the losses due to the excessive fees.  
Although the employee chose the excessive fee option, and there may have 
been stock funds in the menu that did not charge excessive fees, the 
employer’s selection of the options would have been the proximate, 
preceding cause of the loss.  Whether the total number of options was large 
or small is irrelevant to the employer’s responsibility for the imprudent 
selection of the excessive fee option. 
 In summary, some courts have dismissed claims that an employer 
violated the prudent man standard by placing excessive fee investment 
options in its 401(k) plan based on a large menu defense.  The courts have 
reasoned that when a 401(k) plan offers a large number of investment 
options, any losses due to the imprudent selection of an investment option 
resulted not from the employer’s selection of the investment option, but 
from the participant’s exercise of control in choosing to invest in the 
option.  This position is inconsistent with ERISA because the preceding 
proximate cause of losses due to the inclusion of an imprudently selected 
investment in the plan is, in fact, the employer’s decision to include the 
investment in the plan.  The courts’ large menu defense cannot be 
reconciled with a reasonable reading of the control safe harbor.  The courts 
also seem to misunderstand that the purpose of the safe harbor’s legal 
incentives to offer a broad range of investment alternatives is not to inflate 
the size of 401(k) menus, but to encourage employers to offer an 
appropriately diverse set of options.  However, the large menu defense may 
reflect less of a disagreement about the nature of causation or the meaning 
of the safe harbor than a more fundamental ideological view that the 
regulation of plan participants’ 401(k) investments should be left to the 
marketplace rather than ERISA’s fiduciary duties.  
 
                                                                                                                                
documents/areas/fac/accounting/naive_diversification.pdf; see also Jeffrey Brown 
et al., Individual Account Investment Options and Portfolio Choice: Behavioral 
Lessons from 401(K) Plans (NBER Working Paper, No. 13169, June 2007) 
(increasing equity fund representation from 1/3 to 1/2 of menu increased 
participants’ equity allocations by 7.5%) (“Behavioral Lessons”), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13169.pdf?new_window=1; Anders Karlsson et al., 
Portfolio Choice and Menu Exposure, EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings (February 7, 
2006) (likelihood of option being chosen increases with its representation in 
menu), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ 
ssrn.888661.  
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III. FREE MARKETS, LARGE MENUS AND THE FIDUCIARY 
STANDARD 
 
The remainder of this article discusses two major concerns 
regarding the large menu defense.  The first concern is that the large menu 
defense evinces a judicial decision to evaluate employers’ legal 
responsibilities on the basis of judges’ free market ideology instead of 
employers’ fiduciary duties under ERISA.  These judges prefer that 
economic activities be allowed to operate pursuant to free market axioms, 
which conflicts with the imposition of a fiduciary duty on employers.  The 
large menu defense reflects the particular free market axiom that offering 
plan participants the widest possible range of choice in their 401(k) plans 
maximizes social wealth.  However, this position is fundamentally 
incompatible with the mandate in ERISA to enforce the paternalistic 
principles that a fiduciary duty inherently entails, as discussed further in 
this section.  The second concern presented by the large menu defense, as 
discussed in Section IV, is that the courts’ view that large 401(k) menus are 
wealth-maximizing is empirically false.  Large 401(k) menus make 
workers poorer, not wealthier. 
The large menu defense is generally based on the view that free 
market principles are superior to fiduciary duties in regulating employers’ 
selections of 401(k) investment options.  The defense views a large 401(k) 
menu as effectively a marketplace in which the only legally controlling 
factor is the participant’s role in choosing an investment.  Courts in favor 
of the large menu defense found that participants were responsible 
“because of the nature and breadth of funds made available,” “the 
numerous investment options,” and “the wide range of expense ratios 
among” the funds offered.  The plans offered a “variety of risk and fee 
profiles” constituting “meaningful choices about how to invest their 
retirement savings” and included enough investment options from which 
“to create a portfolio tailored to meet [participants’] investment 
objectives.”  
A plan that replicates an open marketplace effectively abrogates 
the employer’s legal responsibility for selecting investment options for the 
plan.  In contrast, Wal-Mart’s “narrower range of investment options” 
made “it more plausible . . . that the Plan was imprudently managed” 
because the invisible hand of the market was replaced with the visible hand 
of the employer.  Where the number of plans is small, the employer may be 
faulted for interfering with free market forces by narrowing participants’ 
investment decisions to an artificially limited set.  If employers allow the 
invisible hand free reign, then they will be relieved of liability.  
352       CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
This ideology is illustrated in Hecker, as quoted approvingly in 
Loomis, where the court notes that Deere’s 401(k) funds “were also offered 
to investors in the general public, and so the expense ratios necessarily 
were set against the backdrop of market competition.”48 The Renfro court 
was similarly skeptical of plaintiffs’ claim that fees were excessive with 
respect to “funds that are available on the same terms to individual 
investors in the open market.” 49  In Loomis, it did not matter that an 
employer chose excessive fee options for the plan; “[a]ny participant who 
want[ed] a fund with expenses under 0.1% [could] get it through Exelon's 
Plan.”50 The courts’ marketplace theory of liability essentially finds that an 
employer can shed its fiduciary role in selecting 401(k) investment options 
by choosing a menu that replicates the marketplace.  
The market-based criteria on which these courts based the large 
menu defense contradict not only the plain meaning of the control safe 
harbor, as discussed supra in Section II, but also the essential nature of the 
fiduciary duty.  Judge Cardozo’s iconic characterization of the fiduciary 
duty in Meinhard v. Salmon tees up the fundamental conflict between 
fiduciary duties and market-based principles:  
 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world 
for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those 
bound by fiduciary ties.  A trustee is held to something 
stricter than the morals of the market place.  Not honesty 
alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is 
then the standard of behavior.51 
 
In the fiduciary context, pure market dynamics cannot be relied upon to 
yield the sought-after social benefits of commercial activities.  Fiduciary 
principles, therefore, are not circumscribed by the rules that apply to 
commercial, “arm’s length” relationships, but are based on non-market 
criteria because markets are not always efficient.  Inefficiencies can reduce 
the social utility of market-based transactions.  These inefficiencies may 
arise from a host of factors, including unequal bargaining positions, 
informational asymmetries, monopoly power, bounded rationality and/or 
                                                                                                                                
48 See supra note 37.  
49 Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 326 (3d Cir. 2011). 
50 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671. 
51 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
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rent-seeking regulation.52 Judge Cardozo may not have been thinking in 
terms of economic theory yet to take concrete form, but he nevertheless 
understood that, in the face of market inefficiencies, “honesty alone,” i.e., 
requiring only that a fiduciary refrain from fraud or other 
misrepresentation, was inadequate to ensure that free market activities 
would increase, rather than reduce, net social wealth. 
Common law and statutory fiduciary duties reflect, respectively, 
courts’ and legislators’ decisions to modify or supplant market forces with 
external rules in situations in which market-based principles are likely to 
fail to create the social benefits of commercial activities.  While there is a 
robust scholarship about when and to what extent fiduciary duties are 
actually wealth-maximizing,53 there is general agreement with the position 
that fiduciary duties are intended to and do, in fact, modify or supplant 
market forces.  They reflect an inherently paternalistic view that, when 
fiduciary duties apply, courts and legislatures should redirect the natural 
course of commerce even if doing so replaces the usually wealth-
maximizing decisions of rational economic actors with the judgment of 
government actors.  
In short, courts applying the large menu defense simply disagree 
with Congress’s decision to impose fiduciary duties on employers when 
selecting 401(k) investment options.  The Loomis court revealed the 
ideological nature of its disagreement with Congress in charging that the 
problem in that case was that the “[p]laintiffs' theory is paternalistic.”54 
This statement, taken literally, is absurd because the legal theories 
underlying a fiduciary claim are necessarily paternalistic.  ERISA is 
paternalistic to its core.  The Congressional findings and declaration of 
policy in ERISA speak of protecting the interests of plan beneficiaries “by 
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for 
                                                                                                                                
52 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. b (2007). 
53 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996) (discussing the scope of managers’ duties 
in the context of the corporation and the corporate contract). See also Paul 
Mahoney, The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might be Right (Univ. 
of Virginia Law School Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 00-8, Jan. 2000) 
(finding higher rates of real per capita growth in common law economies); Ross 
Levine et al., Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes (World 
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 205, Feb. 1999) (finding that common 
law systems enhance financial intermediary development, which causes higher 
economic growth), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=247793. 
54 658 F.3d at 673. 
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fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate 
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”55 Congress 
sought to protect the interests of participants “by improving the equitable 
character and the soundness of such plans.”56 These broad, paternalistic 
goals look to decidedly non-market-based rules to regulate the operation of 
pension benefit plans. 
The ERISA prudent man and prohibited transaction rules give 
concrete form to the paternalistic structure and purpose of ERISA.  
Employee pension plans are required to have a fiduciary and a fiduciary is 
required to assume fiduciary duties with respect to the structure and 
operation of the plan, including selecting investment options in the plan.  
ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules narrowly circumscribe or flatly 
prohibit transactions that normally would be subject only to the rules that 
apply to arm’s-length deals.  ERISA empowers employers to automatically 
enroll employees in a plan and invest an employer-determined percentage 
of the employee’s wages in an employer-selected investment option when 
employees have not affirmatively taken these steps themselves.57  
Regardless of whether ERISA’s paternalism is good policy, its 
paternalism is undeniable.  It is difficult to understand how the Loomis 
court could criticize the “[p]laintiffs’ theory” for being “paternalistic” when 
the private cause of action on which the theory is based is intrinsically 
paternalistic.  This contradiction is sharpened by the fact that the Loomis 
opinion’s author, Judge Frank Easterbrook, established his reputation as a 
scholar by elucidating the paternalistic nature of fiduciary duties and 
identifying situations in which he believed that fiduciary duties should be 
waivable or eliminated.  
As a member of the judiciary, Judge Easterbrook has previously 
attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to substitute a market-based test for an 
express fiduciary duty under federal law.  In Jones v. Harris Associates 
                                                                                                                                
55 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006). 
56 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (2006). 
57  ERISA’s automatic enrollment provision is the regulatory policy most 
extensively discussed in Richard Thaler’s and Cass Sunstein’s best-seller, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS, which is based 
on a regulatory model that they call “libertarian paternalism.” RICHARD THALER & 
CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND 
HAPPINESS (2008).   
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L.P.,58 he authored the opinion that affirmed the dismissal of a claim under 
section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which provides that 
“the investment adviser of a registered investment company shall be 
deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect to the receipt of compensation 
for services.”59  Prior to Jones, courts had generally interpreted section 
36(b) under a fiduciary standard established by the Second Circuit twenty-
five years earlier in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.60 
The Seventh Circuit rejected the Gartenberg standard in holding that the 
fiduciary duty under section 36(b) could only be violated if the fees paid 
were “‘so unusual’ as to give rise to an inference ‘that deceit must have 
occurred, or that the persons responsible for decision have abdicated.’”61 
As in Loomis, the court’s decision was based on its view that market forces, 
not fiduciary duties, should be the exclusive determinant of prices, and that 
“honesty alone” was enough. 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Seventh Circuit’s 
Jones decision. 62  The Court’s analysis is instructive as to the 
incompatibility of strictly market-based rules of construction and the 
intrinsically paternalistic nature of the fiduciary duty.  It pointedly 
summarized the Seventh Circuit’s Jones analysis as follows:  
 
The panel argued that this [deceit-based] understanding of 
§ 36(b) is consistent with the forces operating in the 
contemporary mutual fund market.  Noting that “[t]oday 
thousands of mutual funds compete,” the panel concluded 
that “sophisticated investors” shop for the funds that 
produce the best overall results, “mov[e] their money 
elsewhere” when fees are “excessive in relation to the 
results,” and thus “create a competitive pressure” that 
                                                                                                                                
58 Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated 559 U.S. 
335, 353 (2010). In the interests of full disclosure, this author was an expert 
witness in Jones. 
59 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
60 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
61 537 F.3d at 732. 
62 As the Wall Street Journal editorial page has noted, “It isn’t easy to lose 9 - 
0 on the current ideologically divided Supreme Court.” Editorial, Supremes 9, SEC 
0, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/article 
/SB10001424127887324662404578330260976961512.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_
AboveLEFTTop. 
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generally keeps fees low.  The panel faulted Gartenberg on 
the ground that it “relies too little on markets.”63  
 
The Court flatly rejected the idea that markets set the boundaries of Section 
36(b)’s fiduciary duty.64 Instead, it treated Section 36(b)’s “fiduciary duty” 
as a fiduciary duty.  The Court adopted the traditional fiduciary standard 
that it applied in Pepper v. Litton in 1939—notably reaching back to the era 
of Cardozo’s fiduciary duty in Meinhard—which involved a “dominant or 
controlling shareholder’s claim for compensation against a bankrupt 
corporation.”65 Under that classically paternalistic standard, the shareholder 
had the burden not only “to prove the good faith of the transaction but also 
to show its inherent fairness.” 66  The Court’s holding reflected its 
understanding that a statutory fiduciary duty represents the legislature’s 
decision not to defer blindly to the “morals of the marketplace” because 
free market forces will not always yield an optimal outcome.  
One basis for the Court’s decision was its recognition that free 
markets are not, in fact, necessarily wealth-maximizing.  It warned that, in 
applying Section 36(b), “courts should not rely too heavily on comparisons 
with fees charged to mutual funds by other advisers.  These comparisons 
are problematic because these fees, like those challenged, may not be the 
product of negotiations conducted at arm's length.”67 
In support of this statement, the Court cited the dissent from the 
Seventh Circuit’s denial of a rehearing en banc,68 in which Judge Richard 
Posner had argued that “the panel base[d] its rejection of Gartenberg 
mainly on an economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination on the basis 
of growing indications that executive compensation in large publicly traded 
firms often is excessive because of the feeble incentives of boards of 
                                                                                                                                
63 Jones, 559 U.S. at 342 (quoting Jones, 527 F.3d at 632). 
64 Jones, 335 U.S. at 353.  E.g. id. (“By focusing almost entirely on the 
element of disclosure, the Seventh Circuit panel erred. An investment adviser 
‘must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on 
compensation.’”) (quoting Jones, 527 F.3d at 632)). 
65 Jones, 335 U.S. at 346 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)). 
66 Id. at 346-47 (quoting Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306-07). 
67 Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added). 
68  Id. (citing Jones, 537 F.3d at 731); id. (“Competition between money 
market funds for shareholder business does not support an inference that 
competition must therefore also exist between [investment advisers] for fund 
business. The former may be vigorous even though the latter is virtually non-
existent.”) (quoting Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 929).     
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directors to police compensation.69 Judge Posner continued, “[c]ompetition 
in product and capital markets can't be counted on to solve the problem 
because the same structure of incentives operates on all large corporations 
and similar entities, including mutual funds.”70 The Jones case suggests 
that, if the large menu defense reaches the Court, it will be struck down just 
as decisively as the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Jones. 
Possibly concerned about being reversed on appeal again, Judge 
Easterbrook attempted to distinguish Jones from Loomis on the ground that 
the defendant in a section 36(b) case has a conflict of interest.  A fund 
manager directly benefits from the receipt of fees that the section 36(b) 
plaintiff alleges are excessive.  In contrast, “there is no reason to think that 
Exelon chose the funds to enrich itself at participants' expense.”71 However, 
there is no support, and the Loomis court cited none, for the proposition 
that fiduciary liability under ERISA attaches only with proof of the 
fiduciary’s self-dealing motive.  To the contrary, “the great principles of 
trust fiduciary law, loyalty and prudence, do not depend upon the 
transferor's motive, whether making a gift or doing a deal.”72 A trustee is 
                                                                                                                                
69 Jones, 537 F.3d at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. 
71  Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671 (“[E]xelon had (and has) every reason to use 
competition in the market for fund management to drive down the expenses 
charged to participants, . . . Competition thus assists both employers and 
employees, as Hecker observed.”). It is hard to take this distinction seriously, as 
Judge Easterbrook made the same argument in Jones that a fund manager has the 
same market-based incentive to keep fees low: 
 
Holding costs down is vital in competition, when investors are 
seeking maximum return net of expenses—and as management 
fees are a substantial component of administrative costs, mutual 
funds have a powerful reason to keep them low unless higher 
fees are associated with higher return on investment. A 
difference of 0.1% per annum in total administrative expenses 
adds up by compounding over time and is enough to induce 
many investors to change mutual funds. That mutual funds are 
“captives” of investment advisers does not curtail this 
competition. An adviser can't make money from its captive fund 
if high fees drive investors away.  
 
Jones, 527 F.3d at 631-32. 
72 John H. Langbein, Essay, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an 
Instrument of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 186 (1997). 
358       CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
 
bound to the duties it has assumed regardless of whether it may personally 
benefit from any alleged malfeasance, just as ERISA’s prudent man 
standard applies regardless of whether violating it is accompanied by a 
financial benefit to the fiduciary. 
The Loomis court’s preference for free market principles in 
derogation of express statutory fiduciary duties reveals the ideological 
nature of its position that ERISA fiduciary claims must conform to an 
overriding, rational-actor model of human behavior.  Yet the Supreme Court 
rejected precisely this approach in Jones, namely, the court’s substitution of 
its own economic analysis for Congress’s decision to qualify the primacy of 
the rational actor model by imposing a fiduciary duty in certain situations.  
If and when the market-based, large menu defense reaches the Court, it is 
likely to suffer the same fate as the market-based approach taken in Jones. 
 The large menu defense goes further than exalting free market 
principles over plain statutory mandates; it re-interprets ERISA’s 
diversification requirement as a paean to the liberation ideology of free 
choice.  Courts in favor of the large menu defense consider choice-
maximization to be a central purpose of ERISA.  Tibble’s “centerpiece” of 
ERISA was “participant choice.”73 Renfro viewed ERISA’s diversification 
standard as “being designed to offer participants meaningful choices,”74 as 
echoed by Loomis’s view that its purpose was, “[f]ar from reflecting a 
paternalistic approach, [to] encourage sponsors to allow more choice to 
participants.”75 Loomis applauded Exelon because, as directed by the safe 
harbor, it had “left choice to the people who have the most interest in the 
outcome, and it cannot be faulted for doing this.”76  
The courts’ view that the purpose of ERISA is to maximize 
participant choice, which turns the statute on its head.  Congress did not 
enact ERISA to generate more investment choices for workers; it enacted 
ERISA to enhance their retirement security.  As noted herein, ERISA 
reflects a strongly paternalistic view of pension plans.77 Congress did not 
                                                                                                                                
73 Tibble, 711 F.3d at 1083.   
74 Renfro, 671 F.3d at 327. 
75 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 673. 
76 Id. 
77 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (b)-(c) (2012); Loomis, 658 F.3d at 673; RICHARD H. 
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, 
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (showing that ERISA’s automatic enrollment 
provision is the regulatory policy and is based on a regulatory model that the 
authors call “libertarian paternalism”).   
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enact ERISA to free workers of some imaginary yoke of oppression 
imposed by employers that offer a limited menu of 401(k) investment 
options.  Rather, Congress intended that ERISA restrict employers’ and 
workers’ discretion, respectively, in offering and choosing investments. 
The large menu defense treats consumer choice as an end in itself; 
under ERISA, it is only a means to an end.  The statute does not require 
choice for choice’s sake.  The 404(a) safe harbor mandates at least three 
diversified investment options as a means of maximizing plan participants’ 
wealth, not as a means of promoting individual freedom.  The DOL 
conditions the safe harbor on plans’ offering a “broad range of investment 
alternatives” not in order to enhance rational actors’ ability to maximize 
their personal utility, but to maximize the wealth of plan participants as a 
group based on the government’s faith in a particular theory of investing 
(modern portfolio theory).78  
The incentives that ERISA offers to employers to offer multiple 
investment options, as well as related DOL regulations and interpretation, 
reflect patently paternalistic public policy decisions about what is best for 
workers.  These policies are decidedly not motivated by a liberation 
ideology of individual freedom and choice.  The safe harbors relieve 
employers of liability for following government guidelines in selecting 
investment options, not for seeking to maximize plan participant freedom.  
The courts’ re-characterization of a government mandate based on modern 
portfolio theory as a policy of liberation designed to maximize worker 
freedom is nothing more than wishful thinking, statutory nullification, or 
both.  
 
IV. JUDICIAL ECONOMICS AND THE EMPIRICAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF LARGE 401(K) MENUS 
 
As discussed immediately above, the large menu defense is based 
on the courts’ belief that ERISA’s prudent man rule is rendered inoperative 
                                                                                                                                
78 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(1)(ii) (2010). See Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee 
and the Prudent Investor: The Emerging Acceptance of Alternative Investments as 
the New Fiduciary Standard, 53 S. TEX. L. REV. 653, 666-68 (2012) (discussing 
relationship between modern portfolio theory and the prudent investor rule); W. 
Scott Simon, Illuminating the ‘Broad Range’ Requirement of ERISA Section 
404(c) With the Language of Modern Portfolio Theory Found in the Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act and the Restatement 3rd of Trusts (Prudent Investor Rule),  
13 J. PENSION BENEFITS 87 (2005) . 
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as to an employer’s selection of 401(k) investment options if the employer 
offers a large enough number of investment options.  By offering a large 
menu of options, the employer in Loomis, for example, “left choice to the 
people who have the most interest in the outcome, and it cannot be faulted 
for doing this.” 79  In contrast, employers such as Wal-Mart, that 
paternalistically limit the number of investment options, thereby increase 
their ERISA liability risk.  This judicial exercise of extralegal authority is 
reason to be concerned, but if the courts’ faith in the wealth-maximizing 
effect of choice in 401(k) plans is well-founded, then at least workers 
would be wealthier as a result. 
However, larger 401(k) menus actually reduce workers’ wealth.  
Research demonstrates that the assumption made by free market ideologues 
that increasing choice in 401(k) plans maximizes wealth is empirically 
false.  The courts supporting the large menu defense do not cite any 
research to support their view of the economic benefits of large 401(k) 
menus; they seem entirely indifferent as to whether their theories bear any 
relation to reality.  The effect of the large menu defense is to make workers 
poorer, while also creating a perverse incentive for employers to reduce 
their ERISA liability risk by adding more options to their 401(k) plans. 
The large menu defense reflects the courts’ view of the model of 
plan participants as rational utility maximizers.  Traditional free market 
theory assumes that economic actors are rational.  Consumers make choices 
to maximize their personal wealth, or “utility.”  A larger set of choices 
should enhance consumers’ abilities to maximize their utility because with 
every additional choice, the chance that the set of options will include the 
most utility-maximizing option for a particular consumer increases. 80 
Larger 401(k) menus should therefore be wealth maximizing because they 
increase the likelihood that the set of investment options will include 
utility-maximizing options for every participant.  The more flavors of ice 
cream that are available, the greater the likelihood that the consumer’s 
favorite flavor will be among them.  Conversely, restricting the size of 
401(k) menus should reduce participants’ wealth because a smaller menu is 
less likely to include the particular investment that will maximize a 
participant’s utility. 
                                                                                                                                
79 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 673-74. 
80 See generally Sheena S. Iyengar &Wei Jiang, The Psychological Costs of 
Ever Increasing Choice: A Fallback to the Sure Bet 3 (Columbia Univ., Working 
Paper, 2005) (discussing rational choice theory). 
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In practice, however, offering more choices to consumers adversely 
affects their ability to maximize their utility.  For example, numerous 
studies have shown that offering subjects a small set of purchase options 
increases the likelihood that they will make a purchase.  One prominent 
study found that shoppers were more likely to buy jam when offered six 
flavors to choose from instead of twenty-four.  One reason for the adverse 
effect of providing more choices may be that choice creates stress, which 
was illustrated by a study in which subjects were made to choose from 
among an array of Godiva chocolates.  They reported feelings of regret and 
less certainty when offered thirty chocolates than when offered only six.  
Thus, reducing the number of available choices can create both material 
and psychological benefits. 
While investment options in 401(k) plans are a far cry from jams and 
chocolates, the effects of offering more choice to plan participants is the 
same – and vastly more costly.  Studies have shown that large menus have 
the effect of substantially reducing plan participation rates, thereby 
resulting in huge financial losses to workers.  There is also empirical 
evidence that large menus result in investment options that are lower 
quality and more expensive, lead to inferior asset allocation decisions, and 
impair the effectiveness of disclosure due to information overload.  The 
aggregate effects of the consequences of large menus are an annual 
deadweight wealth reduction of billions of dollars and a less secure 
retirement for millions of Americans.  
 
A.  LARGE MENU EFFECTS – REDUCED PARTICIPATION RATES 
 
The most prominent study on the effect of large 401(k) menus is 
also the most comprehensive.  Three Columbia University researchers 
studied the participation rates of more than 800,000 employees across 647 
plans.81 In short, they found that, with every ten additional options, the 
plan’s participation rate declined by approximately two percentage points.  
As the number of investment options increased from two to eleven, the 
participation rate declined steadily from 75% to 70%.  The participation 
rate remained at approximately 70% as the number of options increased 
from eleven to thirty, at which point the rate began to decline 
approximately two percentage points for each ten-option increase.  The 
                                                                                                                                
81 Id at 2. See also GARY R. MOTTOLA & STEPHEN P. UTKUS, VANGUARD CTR. 
FOR RET. RES., CAN THERE BE TOO MUCH CHOICE IN A RETIREMENT SAVINGS 
PLAN? (2003) (summarizing and commenting on Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80). 
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participation rate declined to 67% when the number of investment options 
increased to thirty-five, and declined further to 61% when the number of 
options reached fifty-six.82 
 These data take on a human face when applied to an actual 401(k) 
plan.  As discussed herein, Deere’s plan included twenty-five core mutual 
fund options and 2,500 additional funds.  The plan had approximately 
31,000 participants,83 which would represent a participation rate ranging 
from 61% to 68%, depending on whether one treated the plan as offering 
more than fifty-six options (61%) or only twenty-five options (68%).84 If 
the plan had offered only two options and achieved a 75% participation 
rate, it would have had approximately 38,000 participants under the fifty-
six-plus-options assumption and 34,000 participants under a twenty-five-
option assumption.  In other words, by providing its employees with a large 
number of investment options, Deere effectively excluded 3,000 to 8,000 
employees from its plan,85 and reduced its ERISA liability risk by doing so.  
 The wealth reduction caused by large menus is staggering, primarily 
because nonparticipation deprives employees of the company match.  
About 85% of plan sponsors make matching contributions to defined 
contribution plans.86 The most common match amount is either 50% or 
                                                                                                                                
82 A 2009 survey by Watson Wyatt found that the most common number of 
options in 401(k) plans was ten to fourteen, with 11% of plans offering more than 
twenty-four options. SeeNews Archives – August / September 2009, BENEFITS AND 
PENSIONS MONITOR ONLINE,http://www.bpmmagazine.com/benefits_news_august 
_september_2009.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2014). 
83 Second Am. Compl. for Breach of Fiduciary Duty at para. 28(a), Hecker v. 
Deere & Co., No. 06-C-0719-S (W.D. Wis., Mar. 6, 2007) 2007 WL 2891544, at 
*8. 
84 If 30,000 participants equaled a 61% or a 68% participation rate, then a 75% 
participation rate would equal, respectively, 36,885 and 33,088 participants 
(.75*(30000/.61) and .75*(30,000/.68)). The participation rate estimates in this 
section are extrapolated from the Columbia analysis for illustrative purposes. They 
are not intended to reflect actual rates, which are generally available in a 
company’s Form 5500 filings. 
85 Exelon’s large menu probably had a similar effect. Approximately 23,000 
Exelon Corp. employees participated in its thirty-two-option retirement plan, 
which, assuming a large-menu-suppressed 68% participation rate, means that 2,000 
fewer employees participated than likely would have participated in a two-option 
plan. See Compl. for Breach of Fiduciary Duty at para. 27(a), Loomis v. Exelon 
Corp., No. 06CV4900 (N.D. Ill.., Sept. 11, 2006), 2006 WL 2791653 (23,000 
participants in Exelon plan). 
86  See AON HEWITT, 2011 TRENDS AND EXPERIENCE IN DEFINED 
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100% of employee contributions up to 6% of their pay.87 Deere offered a 
maximum 401(k) match of 6%, 88  which means that for every $1 
contributed by an employee up to 6% of their pay, Deere contributed $1 to 
the employee’s 401(k) account.  For a Deere employee earning $25,000 
annually who contributed 6% of his pay to Deere’s 401(k) plan, the 6% 
match would represent $1,500 in additional annual income.  The Deere 
employee who does not participate in the 401(k) plan receives none of this 
additional income.  Assuming Deere’s large menu effectively excludes 
3,000 to 8,000 employees from its plan, these employees lose $4.5 to $12 
million in income every year, even before taking into account lost 
investment gains. 
 By offering a large menu, Deere reduces not only its ERISA liability 
risk, but also its compensation expenses.  The $4.5 to $12 million of 
foregone annual income directly increases Deere’s profits.  This means that 
the Seventh Circuit’s assumption that employers do not have a conflict of 
interest in the design of their 401(k) plans is actually false.89 Employers can 
increase their profits by increasing the size of their 401(k) menus because 
                                                                                                                                
CONTRIBUTION PLANS 4 (2011), available at http://www.aon.com/attachments/ 
thought-leadership/2011_Trends_Experience_Executive_Summary_v5.pdf. 
87 See id.  
88 See Hecker v. Deere & Co. 556 F.3d 575, 579 (7th Cir. 2009).  
89  Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671 (Exelon “had (and has) every reason to use 
competition in the market for fund management to drive down the expenses 
charged to participants, . . . Competition thus assists both employers and 
employees, as Hecker observed.”). It is hard to take this distinction seriously, as 
Judge Easterbrook made the same argument in Jones that a fund manager has the 
same market-based incentive to keep fees low: 
 
Holding costs down is vital in competition, when investors are 
seeking maximum return net of expenses—and as management 
fees are a substantial component of administrative costs, mutual 
funds have a powerful reason to keep them low unless higher 
fees are associated with higher return on investment. A 
difference of 0.1% per annum in total administrative expenses 
adds up by compounding over time and is enough to induce 
many investors to change mutual funds. That mutual funds are 
“captives” of investment advisers does not curtail this 
competition. An adviser can't make money from its captive fund 
if high fees drive investors away.  
 
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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that will result in fewer employees taking advantage of the employer 
match.  The employer will still be able to attract workers by advertising 
employee compensation as including a 6% match.  This cause-and-effect 
relationship is, of course, somewhat attenuated, but it is useful in 
illustrating the absurd position in which the large menu defense courts have 
placed employers. 
 In contrast with Deere’s being rewarded for its large menu, Wal-
Mart was punished for offering a limited menu that, precisely because it is 
limited, creates billions of dollars of wealth for its employees.90 The Wal-
Mart plan offered eleven investment options and had approximately one 
million participants, which would represent a 70% participation rate under 
the Columbia analysis.  If Wal-Mart had offered fifty-six options, its plan’s 
predicted participation rate would have been 61%, which translates into 
approximately 130,000 fewer employees participating in the plan.  Wal-
Mart offers a full match up to 6% of the employee’s pay, which for 
130,000 employees earning $25,000 annually would total approximately $2 
billion over ten years, even before taking into account investment gains.  
Thus, Wal-Mart employees’ wealth has been increased by billions of 
dollars because Wal-Mart’s plan has a limited menu of options.  The large 
menu defense creates an incentive, however, for Wal-Mart to increase the 
number of options in its plan in order to reduce its ERISA liability 
exposure.  If Wal-Mart decides to follow the guidance of the courts which 
support the large menu defense, then its workers will be billions of dollars 
poorer as a result.  
 The adverse effects of large menus are most pronounced for the 
groups who stand the most to lose by not participating in 401(k).  The 
Columbia researchers found that the reduction in participation rates caused 
by large menus was even greater for older workers, female workers and 
low-income workers.91 These are the groups for whom inadequate investing 
for retirement will have the direst consequences.  Older workers have less 
time to put away funds for retirement, females live longer and therefore 
have longer retirements to plan for, and low-income workers have the 
greatest need for each additional dollar of income in retirement.  The 
                                                                                                                                
90 Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 603 n.6 (8th Cir. 2009); see 
Ruppert v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 796 F. Supp. 2d 959, 963 (S.D. Iowa 2010) 
(citing argument that limited menu in Braden, compared with large menu in 
Hecker, made imprudent management claim more plausible); Tibble v. Edison 
Int’l, 711 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2013).  
91 Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 16. 
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disproportionate effect of large menus on these groups will impose greater 
financial burdens on society as well because reduced standards of living in 
retirement will inevitably place greater pressure on our already strained 
Social Security system.  
 
B.  LARGE MENU EFFECTS – OVERLY CONSERVATIVE 
ALLOCATIONS 
 
 The losses attributable to large menus are by no means limited to 
lower participation rates.  The Columbia study found that large menus also 
harm participants by causing them to make overly conservative allocations 
of their assets.  This finding is consistent with general research showing 
that increasing choice suppresses risk-taking.  For example, in one study, 
researchers asked subjects to choose from a series of hypothetical salary 
options.  The researchers found that the subjects’ willingness to take risks 
was inversely correlated with the number of options offered.  Similar 
studies have shown that subjects are more likely to make worse decisions 
as the number of options increases.  For example, a 1995 study found that 
doctors, when offered the option of prescribing either of two medicines for 
a medical condition, each of which would have been an improvement over 
doing nothing, usually chose to do nothing.92  
 These responses to increasing the number of choices were similarly 
reflected in plan participants’ allocation decisions.  The Columbia 
researchers found that, for every ten-option increase in the size of the 
menu, participants’ allocations to equity funds decreased by 7.1 to 8.9 
percentage points, “an amount both economically and statistically 
significant (at the 2.5% level).”93 This reduction in equity fund allocations 
is not nearly as striking as the increase in participants who allocated none 
of their contributions to equities.  The researchers found that “the 
                                                                                                                                
92 See Donald A. Redelmeier & Eldar Shafir, Medical Decision Making in 
Situations That Offer Multiple Alternatives, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 302 (1995), 
available at  https://psych.princeton.edu/~psych/psychology/research/shafir/ 
pubs/JAMA.pdf. 
93 See Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 30; see also Sheena S. Iyengar & 
Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation, 94 
J. PUB. ECON. 530 (2010) (finding that when a correlation is statistically significant 
at the 2.5% level, there is a 2.5% chance that a correlation is the result of chance). 
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probability that an individual contributes anything at all to equity funds 
also drops by 3.1-4.6%, significantly different from zero at the 5% level.”94 
 Conversely, a ten-option menu increase resulted in “3.9% and 5.4% 
increases in contribution allocations to, respectively, money market funds 
alone and both money market and bond funds combined.”95  Each ten-
option menu increase also produced “nearly a 2% increase in the 
percentage of choosers who allocated over half their contributions to 
money market funds alone, and a 3.6% increase in the percentage of 
choosers who allocated over half their contributions to money markets and 
bonds combined.”96 This shift of assets to less volatile classes would make 
sense for older workers, but the researchers found that the effects of large 
menus were uncorrelated with age or job tenure.  These effects were 
greater, however, for female workers and low-income workers,97 for whom 
the adverse effects of inadequate retirement preparedness are also greater.98  
 These large-menu effects impose substantial opportunity costs on 
plan participants.  The expected value of a twenty-year investment in 
equities, which is an appropriate investment period in light of the increased 
risk of equity investments, is substantially higher than the expected value 
of a twenty-year investment in bonds or money market instruments.  This 
problem of overly conservative investment options was a concern for the 
                                                                                                                                
94 See Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 30. This tendency may be countered 
if the percentage of equity funds grows with the size of the menu because investors 
tend to increase their allocations to a particular asset class in proportion to that 
asset class’s representation in the menu. See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, 
Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Saving Plans, 91 AM. 
ECON. REV. 79, 87 (2001) (finding that when equity options comprised a larger 
percentage of hypothetical options, study subjects invested a larger percentage of 
accounts in equities than when equity options comprised a smaller percentage of 
options), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/documents/areas/fac/ 
accounting/naive_diversification.pdf; see also Jeffrey Brown et al., Individual 
Account Investment Options and Portfolio Choice: Behavioral Lessons from 
401(K) Plans (NBER Working Paper, No. 13169, June 2007) (increasing equity 
fund representation from 1/3 to 1/2 of menu increased participants’ equity 
allocations by 7.5%) (“Behavioral Lessons”), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w13169.pdf?new_window=1; Karlsson et al., supra note 46 (likelihood of 
option being chosen increases with its representation in menu), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=888661. 
95 See Iyengar & Jiang, supra note 80, at 33-34.   .    
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 31.  
98 Id. at 16.  
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DOL in 2006, when it was considering the kinds of investment options to 
which employers should allocate contributions of participants who 
provided no instructions.  Stable value fund sponsors lobbied the DOL to 
include such funds as “qualified default investment alternatives,” but DOL 
wisely rejected their entreaties.  Its decision to encourage more appropriate 
risk-taking by participants contrasts with the large menu defense’s effect of 
arbitrarily reducing risk-taking by encouraging larger menus.  The large 
menu defense similarly undermines the 2006 legislative reform that 
permitted automatic enrollment of employees in 401(k) plans and has 
substantially increased plan participation rates.  On both fronts, the large 
menu defense courts are effectively undoing the demonstrated benefits of 
regulatory reforms.  
 
C. LARGE MENU EFFECTS – INFERIOR INVESTMENT OPTIONS  
 
 In addition to reducing participation rates and causing overly 
conservative asset allocations, large menus reduce the quality of the 
investment options in 401(k) plans as a group.  Researchers have found that 
the quality of the funds in a plan declines as the number of options 
increases. 99  David Goldreich and Hanna Hałaburda studied 131 401(k) 
plans with the number of investment options offered ranging from four to 
twenty-eight.  They evaluated the objective quality of the plans by 
comparing their respective Sharpe ratios, which measure expected 
investment return in light of the degree of risk taken by the investor.  The 
data showed a negative correlation between the number of investment 
options offered and the quality of the plan that was significant at the 1% 
level.  Like the Columbia group, Goldreich and Hałaburda concluded 
“empirically that larger menus are objectively worse than smaller menus, 
on average, in an important economic context—401(k) pension plans, 
where a plan is a menu of investment choices.” 
 Along the same lines, Nina Tang and Olivia Mitchell found that 
increasing the number of investment options offered in a 401(k) plan did 
not increase the efficiency of the menu.  They evaluated efficiency based 
on each plan’s Sharpe ratio, degree of nondiversifiable risk, and 
participants’ potential welfare/utility loss resulting from a less efficient 
menu.100 They concluded that, “even with a handful of investment choices, 
                                                                                                                                
99 See Goldreich & Hałaburda, supra note 3, at 1. 
100 Ning Tang & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Efficiency of Pension Plan Investment 
Menus: Investment Choices in Defined Contribution Pension Plans (Mich. Ret. 
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participants will not suffer from menu restriction, as long as the choices 
offered are sensible ones.”101 They found that it would be “more sensible to 
add funds that make the menu more efficient, than simply to make the 
menu longer,” 102  which is precisely the intent of the three-option and 
broad-range diversification safe harbor requirements.103  “The key factor 
contributing to plan efficiency and performance has to do with the types of 
funds offered, rather than the total number of investment options 
provided.”104 
 Larger menus are also correlated with higher cost options. 105 
Researchers have found that, as the size of a 401(k) plan’s menu increases, 
the representation of actively-managed funds increases at a greater rate.  
Actively managed funds charge higher fees than index funds, which means 
that larger menus correlate with higher costs.  The higher fees also mean 
that large menus have inferior performance.  The researchers found that, 
while the gross performance of index and actively-managed funds was 
similar, their relative performance net of fees was quite different, with 
index funds substantially outperforming in terms of both investment returns 
and percentile ranking.106 Thus, large menus are correlated with inferior, 
higher-cost, lower-performing investment options and provide no 
efficiency benefits. 
 
D. LARGE MENU EFFECTS AND INFORMATION OVERLOAD 
 
 The foregoing empirical research demonstrates that rational choice 
theory fails in the context of large 401(k) menus, notwithstanding the faith 
that courts in favor of the large menu defense have in the infallible 
                                                                                                                                
Res. Ctr., Working Paper 2008-176, No. UM08-20), available at 
http://www.mrrc. isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp176.pdf. 
101 Id. at 7. 
102 Id. at 16.   
103 See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B)(1-4). 
104 Tang & Mitchell., supra note 100, at 2. 
105 See Brown et al., supra note 47, at 2. 
106 See id. at 26 (“while the actively managed and index equity funds offered 
in our sample of 401(k) plans have similar performance before accounting for 
expenses (index funds actually slightly outperformed, but the difference is not 
significant), they differ significantly in their reported annual expenses (on the order 
of 50 basis points per year), which leads to worse performance after accounting for 
expenses (both in terms of returns and percentile rankings within its investment 
objective.)”). 
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efficiency of “rational” actors and free markets.  Large menus cause 
employees to make worse choices either by making inferior asset allocation 
decisions or by not participating in 401(k) plans at all.  Large menus also 
result in inferior options being selected by employers.  One explanation for 
investors’ behavioral response to large menus is information overload and 
complexity, which is particularly ironic in the context of the free market 
ideology underlying the large menu defense.  That ideology assumes that 
investors are better off with large menus because it is more likely that the 
menu will include, for example, a low-cost fund.  As the Loomis court 
argued, “[a]ny participant who want[ed] a fund with expenses under 0.1% 
can get it through Exelon's Plan.”107 However, the fact that a large menu 
may be more likely to include such a low-cost fund misses the point.  The 
evidence suggests that an investor would be less likely to actually find or 
invest in the 0.1% fund precisely because it was part of a large menu.  
 Researchers have found that search costs are a significant factor in 
the depressing effect of large choice sets on consumers’ willingness to 
make choices. 108  The additional search costs that a large menu of 
investment options imposes may lead investors not to search at all (i.e., not 
participate), or to favor the simplest options, such as money market and 
bond funds.109 They may be more likely to follow irrational heuristics, such 
as making an allocation to equity investments based on the percentage of 
equity options offered.110 Large menus that impose high search costs make 
it less likely that investors are actually exercising the “control” that is the 
basis of the control safe harbor because they will be deterred from 
exercising control by search costs, yet courts employing the large menu 
defense assume that larger menus lead to the exercise of greater participant 
control.  In fact, investors may be more likely to avoid an excessive fee 
fund that is included in a small menu rather than a large one because they 
are more likely to seek out information about a small number of funds than 
                                                                                                                                
107 Loomis, 658 F.3d at 671. 
108  See generally Dmitri Kuksov & J. Miquel Villas-Boas, When More 
Alternatives Lead to Less Choice, 29 MKTG. SCI. 507 (2010), available at 
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ce%202010%20alternatives.pdf; Julie Agnew & Lisa Szykman, Asset Allocation 
and Information Overload: The Influence of Information Display, Asset Choice, 
and Investor Experience, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 57 (2005) (showing that study subjects 
reported greater feeling of information overload with more choices) available at 
http://mason.wm.edu/faculty/agnew_j/documents/assetallocation.pdf. 
109 Kuskov & Villas-Boas, supra note 108, at 512.  
110 See Brown et al., supra note 47, at 18. 
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when intimidated by a large number.  As one research team concluded, “the 
burgeoning number of actively-managed funds [in large 401(k) menus] 
makes it harder for investors to find the lower-cost index fund in the 
plan.”111 In other words, investors are less likely to conduct the information 
search necessary to identify the low-cost needle when included in a large 
menu haystack. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The law and economics movement was the most influential 
jurisprudential development of the 20th century.  The application of 
economic principles to traditional legal concepts has substantially 
improved our understanding of the relationship between law and practice.  
In no field has this been truer than in the regulation of commercial 
activities.  Law and economics has improved our ability to apply traditional 
notions of equity, such as good faith and fair dealing, unconscionability, 
and fiduciary duties, in ways that better achieve their utility-maximizing 
purpose. 
 However, law and economics, especially in the hands of judges, can 
be an instrument of economic destruction when based on blind adherence 
to a free market ideology unmoored from any empirical foundation.  The 
large menu defense adopted by some courts applies an axiom of free 
market adherents—rational choice theory—the social utility of which is 
disproved by empirical research on the actual effect of large 401(k) menus 
on workers’ welfare.  Large 401(k) menus already cost American workers 
billions of dollars every year.  The effect of the large menu defense, unless 
promptly repealed by Congress or overturned by the Supreme Court, will 
exacerbate the problem of large 401(k) menus and cause billions of dollars 
of additional losses. 
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